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Self-heckle: Russell Kane’s stand-up comedy as 
an example of ‘comedic sociology’∗ 
Daniel Smith 
abstract 
This article explores the possibility that stand-up comedy may provide sociology with a 
new lens for interpreting social life. Using British comedian Russell Kane as a case study, 
the article argues that his observational material shares affinities with the sociological 
tradition of interpretivism. Drawing upon the works of Simmel, Bakhtin, Douglas and 
Kane himself, the article outlines the concept of a ‘self-heckle’ – an interpretive device 
whereby comedy acts as cultural criticism providing sociological insight into the lives of 
people. Derived from Kane’s stand-up comedy, ‘comedic sociology’ is able to explore 
social and biographical narratives intersection with wider socio-historical 
transformations, demonstrating comedy’s ability to provide sociological insight into the 
contradictions, absurdities and incongruities of ‘the social’ and the potential to imagine 
life differently. 
Introduction 
In this article I want to outline comedy’s potential to invite people to think 
differently about the established order through an analysis of the observational 
stand-up comedy of prominent UK comedian Russell Kane. Kane’s observational 
comedy provides not only a disruption to conventional assumptions but also 
insights that are potentially of value to the discipline of sociology. While by no 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
∗  I would like to thank Dimitrinka Stoyanova Russell and three anonymous referees for 
their insightful, instructive and critical comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
Thank you to Matthias Varul for his advice on the first draft as well as Sam Friedman 
who, on a chance meeting in the Pleasance Bar at the Edinburgh Festival Fringe in 
2012, also kindly read and commented as well. 
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means suggesting that all stand-up comedy is applicable to these claims, Kane’s 
material and position as a stand-up comedian may be considered ‘comedic 
sociology’. Kane’s material offers not only insight into social life, where stand-up 
comedy acts as the vehicle for social commentary (Mintz, 1985), cultural criticism 
(Koziski, 1997) or communal revelation (Kirby, 1974) but may provide 
sociological truths not captured by mainstream sociology.  
Using Kane’s stand-up as my starting point, I want to argue that sociologists may 
be able to look to certain comedians for methodological insights for illuminating 
‘the social’ in a way which illustrates the absurdities of the social order and its 
ability to be ‘otherwise’, a democratic goal. When Bakhtin observed in Rabelais 
and his world (1984: 91-92) that medieval man took refuge in carnival as it turned 
official images inside out, he noted that it produced an ‘ephemeral truth’ that, 
however brief, became the source of an unofficial truth of the people. Kane’s 
stand-up comedy may have such a truth-value. This extends the ‘stand-up 
comedian as anthropologist’ thesis (Koziski, 1997) as I explore the ‘stand-up 
comedian as sociologist’. Kane’s observational material provides a means to 
conduct a ‘comedic sociology’ which consists in observing, recording and 
dramatising the contradictions, absurdities and incongruities of social life (cf. 
Koziski, 1997). 
In order to achieve this, I illustrate that Kane’s stand-up comedy is of operative 
use to stimulating the ‘sociological imagination’ (Mills, 1959). The contradictions 
of Kane’s own life, illustrated in his comedic routines, act as a reflexive device to 
connect personal troubles of biography with historical and social change. By way 
of an example, I will demonstrate how Kane’s biographical narrative and comic 
material in his award-winning Smokescreens and castles (2011a) can be fruitfully 
complimented by (as well as being an extension to) Young and Wilmott’s classic 
in British sociology, Family and kinship in East London (1957). By placing Kane’s 
material alongside Young and Wilmott’s classic text I will illustrate how Kane 
provides a comedic sociological commentary on the realities of social mobility, 
embourgeoisment and his sense of self. Using Kane’s Smokescreens and castles as 
his starting point, Friedman (2014: 364; emphasis in original) has recently called 
for a sociological research agenda which is attentive to the experience of social 
mobility:  
one which attends to the possibility that people make sense of their social 
trajectories not just through ‘objective’ markers of economic or occupational 
success, but also through symbols and artifacts of class-infected cultural identity. 
As we will see, Kane’s experiences of social mobility manifest in his comic 
observations in Smokescreens and castles itself provides this call for a sociology 
attentive to mobility through symbolic narratives; comedic material provides an 
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interpretive framework for understanding the meaningful realities of the social. 
By drawing upon the works of Douglas (1975) and Bakhtin (1981; 1984) I will 
make the case that comedic sociology can be considered a branch of interpretive 
sociology in the tradition of Simmel (1971a; 1971b). 
Comedic sociology; or, self-heckles 
Before I proceed by outlining what comedic sociology is and how certain stand-
up comedians, such as Russell Kane, are apposite for producing the contents of 
comedic sociologies, I should emphasise: not all stand-up comedians are apt for this 
role. British stand-up comedy at present is diverse and not all acts are appropriate 
for consideration for comedic sociology. British society has witnessed a ‘stand-up 
comedy’ renaissance in recent years and, with this, a diversity of material is 
currently on offer (Friedman, 2011). The diversity of acts spans from surreal, 
absurdist comics – Tim Key to Adam Buxton – to family-friendly observational 
material – Michael McIntyre – to satirical, political humour – Stewart Lee and 
Josie Long. 
Since the ‘alternative comedy’ movement of the 1980s, many ‘acts’ are social 
commentators as they make use of the intellectual resources of high-culture to 
prefigure social and political mandates (Scott, 2005). This spans the ‘alternative 
comedy’ of Ben Elton to contemporary political acts, e.g. Mark Thomas (Quirk, 
2010), to feminist acts such as Sara Pascoe. The legacy of the ‘alt comedy’ 
movement is that ‘the culturally privileged are, to some extent, creating new 
forms of ‘objectified’ cultural capital via the careful consumption of ‘legitimate’ 
items of British comedy’ (Friedman, 2011: 348). Friedman (2011: 354) points out 
– in a similar vein to this article – that comedy has been ‘consecrated by 
academics’ in scholarly analysis of their material. With certain comedians – e.g. 
Stewart Lee – sociological observation and arguments appear in their acts as 
much as they inform it. Yet not all observational material which satirises or 
becomes social-cultural commentary is comedic sociology, even if the arguments 
their material presents have validity, currency or what Witkin (2003) would call 
the ‘truth-value’ of a work of art as its contents mirrors the realities found in the 
organisation of social life. 
Rather, the crux of comedic sociology is that it stems from a comedians’ 
sociological imagination, the narrative intersection of biography with socio-
historical horizons. This is at the heart of Kane’s stand up: 
The genre I work in most frequently is what I like to call socio-observational – a 
blend of angry sociology and silly observations that allows me to make pseudo-
Marxian arguments with an air of joie de vivre; basically silliness which may or may 
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not have a message…I have large sections with jokes and ponderings upon the 
received differences between working-class and middle-class culture - …how 
working class culture functions on a reverse value-system – how as a child my 
peers and I would compete to fail exams...I bring in various characters, my father, 
my brother; places…and suddenly the observations and humour are lifted into the 
realm of what I call the ‘utterly human’ – to be human is to be simultaneously 
involved in many narratives at once (Kane, 2007: 127 original emphasis). 
Hence certain stand-up comedians, even observational comedians, do not fit 
these criteria, e.g. Jim Davidson, Michael McIntryre, James Acaster. A comedic 
sociology rests upon the comic’s ability to provide sociological observations 
which illustrate wider socio-cultural realities; this may or not may arise from the 
point of intersection with their own biography. In the case of Kane, the 
biographical element is crucial but this is not essential for ‘comedic sociology’1. 
C. Wright Mills’ statement that ‘men do not usually define the troubles they have 
in terms of terms of historical change and institutional contradiction’ (1959: 3) is 
able to be contended with Kane’s comedy shows as they define personal 
problems in the light of wider sociological transformations. Penfold-Mounce, et 
al. (2011: 153) have reminded sociologists that Mills included many practitioners, 
not just sociologists, into his definition of the sociological imagination: 
journalists, novelists and, for Penfold-Mounce, et al., the writers of HBO’s The 
Wire, or for myself, comedian Russell Kane. 
Since it derives from his biography, Kane’s observational material is also a 
branch of interpretative sociology – a hermeneutic commentary upon one’s own 
life. Below I will use Kane’s Smokescreen’s and castles (2011) as an illustration of 
this comedic sociology but first I want to, theoretically, elaborate upon the 
parallels between Kane’s material and the epistemological position taken in 
interpretive sociology, especially that of Simmel (1971a; 1971b). By elaborating 
upon Simmel’s philosophy of social science in relation to comedy, I want to draw 
some connections with the works of Bakhtin (1981; 1984) and Douglas (1975) to 
illustrate the comic dimensions of the interpretive procedure and illustrate what I 
mean by a ‘self-heckle’. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As a referee of this article has pointed out to me, the biographical element is not 
essential to comedic sociology but rather a strategy employed by Russell Kane. To be 
clear, the examples and thinking expressed in this paper refer to Russell Kane but, 
hopefully, will be able to be applied or explored in more general terms. It is, however, 
beyond the scope of this article to substantiate this and as such I stick solely to 
Russell Kane as an exemplar of ‘comedic sociology’ or, as the referee suggested, a 
reflexive form of ‘comedic sociology’. 
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In Simmel’s sociology we find a similar approach taken by the observational 
stand-up comic, especially Kane 2 . Observational comedians and interpretive 
sociologists’ share an epistemological starting point to their respective crafts and 
professions. A sociology that interprets life is one that rests upon the 
comprehension of the ideas and ideals that define it (King, 2004). It follows that 
to provide a hermeneutic critique of life, that is, draw out the limits of our 
understanding and comprehension of it, is to adequately understand it and its 
central ideas and principles of legitimacy (King, 2004: 213). From this, to ‘make 
fun’ is to have understood the contents of social life and show their limited 
conceptions, their internal contradictions and inadequacy to provide a ‘full 
picture’ through humour – i.e. incongruity and comic reduction. The ‘self-heckle’ 
of this paper is therefore the sociological value of comedy as cultural criticism: it 
brings to light inadequate, everyday conceptions of the ‘social’ and demonstrates 
our partial, limited understanding we may hold about ‘other’ people.  
Self-heckle 1: Stereotypes 
Anyone acquainted with Kane’s comedy will know the phrase ‘self-heckle’ comes 
from his act; a frequent comic refrain, a ‘self-heckle’ arises when Kane draws 
attention to his own comic persona, his own material and status as a performer. 
Owing to his background in English literature, Kane uses the refrain to highlight 
the reflexivity of comedy, its ability to dissolve the solidity of genres and highlight 
the constructed-ness of any text, e.g. ‘He’s so postmodern, he’s heckling himself.’ 
‘Self-heckle. Postmodern!’ This device, however, is also a feature of comedic 
discourse that, when applied to social commentary and observation, acts as a 
scheme for alternative modes of knowing: comedy provides the realisation that 
life ‘could be otherwise’ (see Bakhtin, 1984; 1981; Douglas, 1975). 
Simmel’s ‘How is society possible?’ (1971a) offers an intellectual starting point 
for this feature of comic observation. Simmel (1971a: 6-8) begins with the 
premise that the ‘contents’ of social life are not given by any objective reality but 
rather formed by the individuals who compose them. When it comes to how we 
conceive of those we interact with, Simmel (1971a:9) claims that all our 
understandings are ‘based on certain distortions’. We never appreciate the 
absolute individuality of others but rather always have a limited conception of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Consider, for example, how Erving Goffman is often accused (somewhat unfairly) 
that his sociology consists of ‘no more than a series of idiosyncratic observations 
about trivial features of social life’ (Giddens, 1988: 252). Gidden’s criticism is more 
the description of some observational comedy than that of a sociologist. What I am 
suggesting here is that interpretive sociology, which consists in various inferences 
from the idiosyncrasies of everyday life, is in fact a virtue for comedic sociology and 
the epistemological position of interpretive sociology as such. 
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them as a social type, e.g. officer, priest, slave, lord, prostitute, etc.; these are 
imposed objective categories which are not real in and of themselves. For 
Simmel (1971a: 10), to fully appreciate the absolute individuality of others is 
impossible: ‘all relations… are determined by the varying degrees of this 
incompleteness’. Ironically, however, the absolute individuality of each person 
depends upon the generalisations of social type, e.g. a typical pious priest is such 
only insofar as he could be equally considered what he is not (Simmel, 1971a: 12-
13). Simmel points out that it is in fact the very cloaked or veiled understandings 
we have of others which ‘makes possible the sort of relations we call social’ 
(1971a: 12). 
In the case of stand-up comedy, routines rely upon cloaked understandings of 
others, notably stereotypes, as comedic devices. Through these comedic conceits 
we gain appreciation of Simmel’s philosophical conception of the social. But we 
also appreciate how Simmel’s position allows comedic routines to reveal that the 
‘world could be otherwise’. Exposure of cloaking allows for a possible release 
from cloaked social positions. Kane’s use of ‘self-heckles’ on his class position is 
a case in point. In a BBC Radio 1 broadcast, Kane (2014) asks a woman her name 
and where she comes from: 
Audience member: Abby. 
Kane: Abaaay. The Essex spelling would be ABAAAY, ‘Abaaay!’ But you’re not, 
you’re from London, right Abbs? Where are you from? 
Audience member: Suffolk. 
Kane: Random! Abbs is so from Suffolk, she’s going to heckle me with a Quails 
Egg! ‘Take that you pickey brute!’ ‘Here’s a tomato, that’s sun-blushed you Essex 
mo-fo!’ 
Here Kane uses cloaked classed stereotypes to illustrate partial understandings of 
both Abby and himself; Abby’s middle-class position is inferred by Kane from 
her being from Suffolk, extended into food preferences and prejudice toward 
Kane’s Essex-based working class position. Kane’s exaggerated, veiled dramatic 
characterisations of class personages fill in his sociological narrations and 
observations. By giving class identity an exaggerated veil we gain appreciation 
that the distorted gaze, which Simmel states is a necessary presence for ‘social 
interaction’, is ultimately a fictional personification of someone ‘not ourselves’. 
We are not solely bound to the realities of a stratified society. We are all equally 
inadequate versions of ourselves. As Simmel (1971a: 10) observes, ‘all of us are 
fragments, not only of general man, but also of ourselves’. Comedy can joyously 
highlight this facet of the social and, manifest through the comic, laughter is able 
to free people from the realities that social typologies impose (Bakhtin, 1984). 
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It is in comedic discourse where this epistemological position on the social is 
made tenable and, also, where a claim to possible release from class distortions 
of self gets validity. As Bakhtin (1981) notes, the use of comic verbal style relies 
upon heteroglossia, the many tonged nature of speech; the diversity and un-
limitedness of subject positions available 3 . Comic speech uses ‘parodic 
stylisations’ (as Bakhtin calls it) of other people’s speech to wrestle authority away 
from any discourse or claim to a single (and partial) point of view. As Kane 
parodies classed prejudices, his active bringing together of competing view-
points of British social class acts as a device to reveal the limits of one-sided class 
positions. But it also liberates both him and others from class personifications: 
through the parody we realise the conditions of our own views on other people 
and how these distortions limit our view of ‘the other’. 
Self-heckle 2: Persona and ideal-types 
That comedy is not ‘serious’ does not limit its claim to certain visions of the 
social world (Bakhtin, 1984). Comedy’s fictions are similar to sociology’s 
constructed categories. For Simmel, sociology is the study of societal forms and 
types – from economic exchange to social characters (the poor, the nobility, etc.) 
– where social processes form their content and determine their specific 
empirical reality. However, in ‘The Problem of Sociology’ (1971b), Simmel notes 
that despite the fact that categories employed (‘nobility’, ‘prostitution’, etc.) have 
no objective reality, ‘we’ – members of society – are compelled into believing 
there ‘is’ a society which constitutes a totality. Simmel (1971b: 27) notes: 
The fact that an extraordinary multitude and variety of interactions operate at any 
one moment has given a seemingly autonomous historical reality to the general 
concept of society. Perhaps it is this hypostatization of a mere abstraction that is 
the reason for the peculiar vagueness and uncertainty involved in the concept of 
society and in the customary treatises in general sociology. 
The empathy required to ‘understand’ the realities of the social hypostasis, or 
what Weber (1949) called ‘ideal types’, is crucial to interpretive sociology’s 
methodology. The quotations from Simmel rest upon the Kantian claim that our 
knowledge of social reality is dependent upon the point-of-view of the observer 
(Weber, 1949). As already noted, comedy – like interpretive sociology – relies 
upon assumed fixed characterisations. And comedy also relies upon a similar 
hypostasis that Simmel refers to with regard to ‘society’. Comedians often use 
hypostatic ideal-types in their acts, relying upon an empathetic identification with 
collective categories. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 For the influence of Simmel’s sociology and philosophy of social science on Bakhtin, 
see Nielsen (2002: esp. 96-99).  
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Kane may be said to be engaging in ideal-type constructions to frame his comedic 
narratives and observations. The collective ‘we’s’, as in ‘we [nationality]’, ‘we 
[ethic group]’, etc., is a performative device which does not merely engage an 
audience but also constructs a line of argument through comic material. Mintz 
(1985: 75-76) states that comedians act as mediators as they themselves take on 
collective categories of class, race, gender and so forth to establish their persona 
and frame their material on this. Russell Kane’s 2009 Edinburg Fringe show 
Human dressage is a case in point, reviewed by Cavendish (2009): 
it’s the codified, subtly coerced ‘dressage’… the way we perform dances – ‘social, 
biological, physical’ – to attain approval and acceptance. […] The more you listen to 
him, though, the more you’re forced to concede that he might well have a valid 
point. He reduces British behaviour – with its repressions and sudden violent 
outbursts – to a simple formula: ‘the passion and the pause’. Hence all that 
drunken Friday-night bother we get on the streets – it’s the flipside of the rest of 
the week’s restraint. Kane rams his abstract ideas home with clusters of research 
and concrete examples from his working-class upbringing. His uptight, BNP-
supporting dad, his own tortured, autodidactic adolescent self – at once diffident 
and defiant – and his free-thinking cockney Nan are all trotted out as supporting 
evidence for his arguments. 
What is being implied in Cavendish’s review is something like sociological 
observations becoming the well-spring of comic material. Kane will perform the 
‘dressage’: his role as comic personifies the performative aspects of his social 
observations. However, his routine engages in ideal-type construction to provide 
an attempted social aetiology. The fetishisation of national character (as the 
central facet of nationhood), here ‘British repression’, is used to explain binge 
drink culture. The conventional point-of-view that people have of ‘the British’ 
becomes a source for comedic routines as much as a sociological explanation of 
‘binge drinking culture’. Such sociological content is a sociological exegesis of 
wit; to laugh at the social world by way of its own jokes immanently within it. 
This is not dissimilar to Douglas’ claim that ‘a joke is seen and allowed when it 
offers a symbolic pattern of a social pattern occurring at the same time.’ (1975: 
98) Because of this, social forms/ideal types provide the possibility for jokes to 
reveal the limitations of human thought on the social. 
Self-heckle 3: Narratives beyond society? 
The content of Kane’s comedic material and its performance is not affirmative of 
social life as it is established and lived. This is what Bakhtin (1984) refers to as 
carnival laughter’s ability to move beyond official truths to unofficial, 
universalised truths of the popular assorted masses. For Bakhtin, laughter 
involves freeing from truths particularised around caste, church and family. The 
oppressive ‘official’ thought patterns that are brought to bear on social actors are 
relieved in the mirth of carnival, ultimately liberating them from internal and 
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external censor (Bakhtin, 1984: 94). For Bakhtin, the carnival festival gave this 
popular, ‘social consciousness of all the people’ (1984: 92) laughter a form and a 
means to express this libidinal release. Festival became a way to assert alternative 
truths in a living ritual practice. And yet it remained only a ‘mere festive luxury’ 
(1984: 95), a facet of a comedic ‘institution’ with its own time, place and 
structured chaos. But the luxury of laughter is not to denounce its power. 
While stand-up comedy in Britain is a part of what Adorno would call the culture 
industries, the material by certain comedians such as Kane cannot be solely 
reduced to the claims made by critical theorists: ‘the paradise offered by the 
culture industry’, to paraphrase Adorno (1973: 142; brackets added), ‘is [not] the 
same old drudgery’. In British stand-up comedy, the site of ‘festive’ popular 
laughter is the ‘set’ routine. That said, Bakhtin’s ‘carnival’ has no analogue in 
contemporary society; the fleshy, convivial experience has little parallel with 
stand-up comedy. However, the central point to take away from Bakhtin is that 
the ‘people’s laughter’ is an invitation to imagine the world differently. As such 
our ‘carnival’, if we can still use the term, is the institutional comedic ‘set’ which 
Kane (2007: 130) identifies as having six types: ‘the five-minute ‘open spot’; the 
ten minute half-set; the fifteen minute; the ‘paid’ twenty; the forty-minute 
headline set; and the solo show’. These sets are limited in terms of time, of 
course. Yet Kane argues that the best means to achieve cathartic laughter is the 
use of story-telling. Narrative is at the heart of the comic’s ability to deliver an 
argument, theme and series of unofficial truths beyond the official reality. This is 
what Kane (2007: 133), with obvious irony, calls his ‘“Kaneian” narrative tools’: 
Comedy can highlight the hidden narratives of life. It’s the opportunity for a blind 
comic to convey a unifying piece of storytelling to a room full of randomly 
assembled people and bring them together in empathy, interest and finally, 
hopefully, laughter of recognition; for narrative, whilst enabling the audience to 
enjoy the perspective of The Other, a life view of the seemingly alien, can 
paradoxically show the humanness, the sameness, the ordinariness of this world 
view. 
Beyond our limited experiencing and understanding of the world, the aim of 
Kane’s comedic ‘self-heckles’, the reflexive-ness of genre and constructed-ness of 
the social, are an attempt to move ‘us’ beyond the lived realities, not to a utopia 
but a re-evaluation of our worlds in conceptual terms. 
The logic of comedic sociology; or, how jokes register social contradictions 
Comedic sociology will interpret the world differently but will not actively change 
it. As Critchley (2002: 17) puts it, ‘humour does not redeem us from this world, 
but returns us to it ineluctably by showing that there is no alternative’. Comedic 
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sociology, as I want to define it, engages in comic abstractions of wider 
sociological realities mediated by performative jest so as to illustrate the realities 
of the social. But nonetheless jokes are discursive; they make arguments for 
alternatives. Jokes figure in the total modes of speech and argumentative 
schemes social actors may employ (see Palmer, 1994). Indeed, Douglas (1975) 
argues that a joke’s occurrence should be studied in relation to all modes of 
linguistic expression found in a society. For Douglas (1975), a joke is something 
like a logical possibility found within a series of social patterns, practices and 
symbols. It is an expression which offers a commentary upon the wider pattern 
of social relations. 
Douglas’ (1975: 96) argument states that a joke is an utterance founded doubly 
upon economy of expression and incongruity: 
A joke is a play upon form. It brings into relation disparate elements in such a way 
that one accepted pattern is challenged by the appearance of another which in 
some way was hidden in the first. 
Douglas goes beyond this formula to stress the social dimension and context of 
the joke’s utterance – a joke can only appear, Douglas argues, if there is a 
contradiction within the social structure: ‘if there is no joke in the social 
structure, no other joking can appear’ (Douglas, 1975: 98). Jokes express the 
social situation: the patterns of social relations, their orchestration and implicit, 
shared assumptions. Kane would agree. For Kane (2007: 125), jokes are also 
plays upon form, ‘a representation of the opposite’ which induces a cathexis, as 
Freud suggested. Crucially, Kane introduces the importance of narrative. The 
narrative element is crucial to how Kane’s jokes register social patterns (Palmer, 
1994). 
Narratives are the keystone to the whole joke material: 
comedy can express itself visually…but ultimately it is a language art – and there 
ARE some rules…[T]here is always a build, a cumulative effect that grows and 
swells toward a satisfying narrative release. (Kane, 2007: 128, emphasis in 
original) 
This is how Kane’s comedic sociology works: it establishes a narrative whereby 
social contradictions lead the audience through humorous realisations of the 
social order’s contradictions, incongruities and injustices. All via the medium of 
the joke itself. As Palmer (1994: 113) observes, the narrative structure offered in 
jokes are often ‘realist’ in genre, where a point ‘a’ to ‘b’ is achieved. In the case of 
Kane, social realism underlines his comic material. This is what I want to call the 
‘logic of comedic sociology’: it offers observational narratives on key concepts 
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(e.g. class, race, etc.) in order to produce a symbolic narrative upon wider social 
realities through the guise of incongruous witticisms.  
The clown’s propositional fallacies 
That being the case, Kane is first and foremost a comedian – not a sociologist in 
disguise, or political campaigner whose medium is comedy (cf. Koziski, 1997: 
92). And his comedy is, as stated, a mixture of social observation and silliness – 
he is a social commentator who is first and foremost a ‘fool’, a social type whose 
paradoxical status makes him simultaneously venerated and denigrated (Klapp, 
1949: 161). This is a problem for a comedy that is sociologically resonant. Is Kane 
actually a fool and therefore not worth listening to? Or is he playing the fool and 
really an astute social commentator? Following Mintz (1985), I want to argue that 
Kane’s use of foolishness in his comic persona is in fact a mediatory device to 
construct arguments, a special type of argument I am calling ‘propositional 
fallacies’. Kane combines foolery with foolish discourse in order to provide a 
narrative means to argue for alternative social-cultural outlooks and 
understandings. 
To begin this claim, Kane’s novel The humourist (2012) is a good place to start. In 
a climactic scene, Kane’s protagonist, a comedy-savant, is forced to accept Woody 
Allen’s dictum that ‘there is no such thing as substance or material, only pure 
“ineffable funniness”’ (2012: 252) by a comedy shaman. Additionally, Kane has 
argued against the motion of ‘does comedy need to have a point?’ on BBC 
Radio4xtra podcast What’s so Funny? Starting unequivocally, he states: 
Absolutely not. Not at all. I write shows that have a point but I will cry with 
laughter at Tim Vine […] I’m what I call socio bi-lingual. I can speak and write in 
this mode I’m speaking in now, full of self-insight, but I can also can go home and 
laugh because my mate’s farted. […] This is something I want to explore in the 
novel I’m writing. Some things are just funny. (Kane, 2011b)  
The distinction between ineffable funniness and point-laden material rests upon 
the social practice of ‘comedy’, its performative accomplishment, i.e. how 
‘successful’ comedian’s acts are. 
What Kane calls ‘ineffable funniness’ is what comedians, as social actors, wish to 
achieve: they want to make a room laugh. Comedy with a ‘point’ is achieved if 
and only if the comedian is funny. David Robb’s (2010) study on GDR political 
‘clowns’, Wenzel and Mensching, pin-points this distinction. As Wenzel remarks 
to Robb: ‘The political doesn’t interest me in the first instance as a clown. For me 
the problem becomes political only after I’ve solved it aesthetically’ (in Robb, 
2010: 91). Wenzel’s point is that, for the clown, the aesthetics comes prior to 
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point proving. As such, Robb (2010: 91) cogently argues, a clown’s act, ‘while 
containing a symbolic revolutionary component, should not merely be reduced to 
political subversion’. Ineffable funniness is such an aesthetic abstraction; it relies 
not upon an epistemological argument but rather can be seen to arise from the 
desire for comedic actors to prove their ‘funniness’. Ineffable funniness is sought 
in comedic practice; it is achieved ‘on stage’. However, being ‘funny’ is what 
allows comedians to formulate their arguments. Being funny pre-figures the 
logic and organisation of comedic material, that is, ‘the point’ or argument they 
are trying to make.  
If comedy is merely unserious laughter, then how does Kane’s comedy resonate 
with the serious issues of sociology? The point is that Kane uses the figure of the 
clown to mask his more explicit, serious claims. The clown, as Bakhtin (1981: 
159) observes, has  
the right to be ‘other’ in this world, the right to not make common cause with any 
single one of the existing categories life makes available…Therefore, they can 
exploit any position they choose, but only as a mask. 
Silliness gives Kane comedic licence to figure sociological arguments in his act – 
that is, ‘propositional fallacies’. 
Propositional fallacies have the essential feature of a joke as they rest upon 
incongruity and produce false conclusions. Kane will employ them as a part of 
his comedic act by way of identifying a contradiction. For instance, ‘who invented 
the equation of overly posh dining room table and working class household?’ 
when the posh table becomes a nuisance and point of contention due to fear of 
scratches and breakages (Kane, 2011a). Propositional fallacies are a way into the 
mode of joking Kane performs; they begin a routine. But with jokes, 
propositional arguments do not produce valid conclusions which affirm the state 
of affairs in the world, as with official rituals. Jokes may be conceptualised as 
what anthropologists call rites, or more specifically anti-rites (Douglas, 1975). 
Unlike rites which resolve contradictions for the celebration of the social order, 
anti-rites leave the contradiction open to question the social order – for instance, 
‘who invented the equation posh table and poor family?’ 
Typically rites have three phases and we may draw comparisons with certain 
jokes in this respect. While anthropological theory treats rites as a performative 
practice, the argument I am making here applies to jokes more conceptually 
rather than as sourced from ethnographical field research as found in 
anthropology. Van Gennep’s Rites de passage (1960) states rites have a three-fold 
structure: A (separation from social order and accepted reality) to B (liminality, 
movement into uncharted territory) to C (re-integration into social order and 
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official reality). Conceptually, jokes, however, are anti-rites (Douglas, 1975: 102). 
In an anti-rite the jester will move from A to B and then back to A so as to not 
reintegrate but leave contradictions open. A joke connects symbols of social life 
where the ‘the kind of connection of pattern A with pattern B…is such that B 
disparages or supplants A’ (Douglas, 1975: 102) as opposed to official ritual 
which triumphs existing ideologies. Using the example just given, the pattern is 
(A) ‘who invented posh table / poor family?’ to (B) the liminal comedic space 
where the social situation is questioned, i.e. the comedic content, back to (A) 
again. As such, material is able to be a propositional fallacy by employing what 
Freud called the ‘tendency to economy’ (or thrift) found in wit. Jokes exemplify 
‘the manifold application of the same words in addressing and answering’ 
(Freud, 1916: 51). A propositional fallacy addresses and answers in the same 
terms. This tautological operation (of A to B to A) undertaken in observational 
material on sociological cases is of operative use in critiquing the social world so 
as to show its inadequacies and limitations. 
Jibes on sociological realities use propositional fallacies to critique the existing 
order. Kane uses this when he critiques what he takes to be negative aspects of 
social life, a key example being his father’s racism. In a bit concerning recycling, 
he asks,  
Why is it that someone who is right wing and racist, like my Dad is, naturally 
disbelieves climate change? There is no link whatsoever between hating brown 
and black people and not being into recycling…If anything you’d think that 
recycling would appeal to the racist mind: tin in one bag, paper in another bag, 
cardboard in a separate bag. Everything in its different groups…off to the 
incinerator. (Kane, 2011a) 
Following Quirk (2010: 121) we notice that ‘by building on the easily-accepted 
premise’ of the racist, Kane’s material seeks to seduce the racist into that which 
they ‘naturally’ disparage in order to support his conclusions. This works as a 
propositional fallacy of the type ‘P therefore Q’: 
If you are a racist you like to discriminate ([P therefore Q]) 
Recycling discriminates (& Q) 
Racists like recycling. (- P) 
Of course, this is fallacious logical reasoning. Its premises are true but 
conclusion false – it is what philosophers call a ‘modus morons’: it can be 
written, [(P therefore Q) & Q] |= P (Teichman and Evans, 1995: 221). This fallacy 
in the comic routine is thus able to act as a comedic rite. By using the connection 
of two symbols, racism and recycling, it sociologically translates them into ‘right-
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wing person’ and ‘left-wing person’ as well as ‘working class, right wing father’ 
and ‘embourgeoised, left wing son’, so that B (recycling, left wing son) disparages 
A (racist, right wing father). In doing so, the propositional fallacy comes to stand 
for social structure and its contradictions. By way of jest, it celebrates anti-
structure – communitas and separation from the world (Douglas, 1975:103-104), a 
freedom from its categories by disparaging them through false but ingenious 
logic. 
Smokescreens and castles: The comedic sociology of embourgeoisment 
The culmination of Kane’s comedic sociology is his historic double award-
winning Smokescreens and castles (2011a). What I want to demonstrate here is how 
Kane’s comedic sociology, his use of ‘self-heckles’ (stereotypes, hypostasis and 
narratives) as well as ‘propositional fallacies’, all come together in Smokescreens 
and castles as it develops a narrative arc which is able to illuminate wider socio-
historical structures in British society. Kane’s narrative in Smokescreens and castles 
provides a personal journey: from working-class council estate in Essex to 
middle-class stand-up comedian. Throughout there is a series of ‘hidden injuries’ 
associated with this self-transformation (cf. Friedman, 2014). It is this 
biographical narrative which provides the space for the critique of the social 
structure, the joke of ‘becoming middle class’. 
Kane’s narrative, I claim, is a comedic sociology as it resonates with socio-
historical transformations in the British class structure, notably 
embourgeoisment since the 1950s. With the assistance of the sociological classic, 
Family and kinship in East London (Young and Wilmott, 1957), I will demonstrate 
how Smokescreens and castles is a comedic extension to the sociological realities 
Young and Wilmott elucidate in their interview/ethnography of ex-London Essex 
council estate residents. While I do not wish to make any unsubstantiated trans-
historical claims regarding the content of Family and kinship and Smokescreens 
and castles, I am claiming that one may read the two stories in tandem, one 
sociological research with a conceptual narrative and the other a comedy show 
with a biographical narrative4. 
Peter Young and Michael Wilmott’s Family and kinship in East London (1957) is a 
study of social change and its sociological narrative is ‘about the effect of one of 
the newest upon one of the oldest of our social institutions. The new is the 
housing estate…The old institution is the family’ (Young and Wilmott, 1957: 11). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 There is no evidence that Kane has read Family and Kinship but he has stated, via 
personal communication, ‘you've intuited most of what I'm up to behind the scenes 
as it were’ (Kane, personal correspondence, 25/01/2013). 
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Specifically, the impact of the suburban housing estate on the working classes 
documented through a focus upon residents of Bethnal Green moving to Leigh-
on-Sea, Essex. This transformation is where Kane (2008) fits in as Smokescreens 
and castles is about his relationship with his childhood home (the castle) and his 
father, ‘18 stone of cockney, shaven headed, racist Bethnal Green, Dad’, and his 
growing up in Essex, Leigh-on-Sea. 
Family and kinship stands as a sociological document which vividly depicts the 
experience of post-war ‘embourgeoisment’ in Britain. The working-class, 
extended family and neighbour relations with strong social ties of community 
and social capital was exchanged for ‘suburbia’ where houses are dotted around 
the countryside, neighbours are strangers and there is an absence of extended-
kinship. Life in Bethnal Green was traded, Young and Wilmott (1957: 128-129) 
point out from interviews, for the promise it brought to the children – it was 
‘better for the kiddies’ in the form of housing, health benefits and opportunity. 
Embourgeoisment, symbolically expressed in the move to Greenleigh, bought the 
Bethnal Green migrants to a comparatively ‘unfriendly’ environment. Whereas 
Bethnal Green privileged community and open-ended exchanges between 
families, Essex offered a polite yet ever present hostility between neighbours. It 
gave rise to a mentality of ‘keeping ourselves to ourselves’ as keeping up with the 
Joneses crept in: ‘Just because they’ve got a couple of ha’pence more than you 
they don’t want to know you’, as one Mrs Morrow put it (in Young and Wilmott, 
1959: 149).  
Kane’s Smokescreens and castles is metaphor for this mentality of ‘keeping 
ourselves to ourselves’ and embourgeoisment producing a ‘being better than 
others’ hostility. Kane expresses this by taking as his starting point his father 
building an extension on their council home and installing a swimming pool in 
the garden: a ‘castle’ of a council house. Kane’s narrative is situated within the 
sociological transformation documented by Young and Wilmott and how the 
1980s Thatcherite, individualistic bourgeois housing policy impacted upon his 
upbringing. As Kane explains, buying the council house is a metaphor for the 
personality of his father but also embourgeoisment. After the council house 
extension was finished, he says, his parents Julie and Dave become ‘Juliet and 
David overnight’ so as to entrench, via elocution, their movement between 
classes as described by Young and Wilmott: ‘their [Kane’s parents] accents 
changing from the broad London accent to the pinched Leigh-on-Sea slightly try-
hard Essex accent, which ironically slightly sounds more moronic than the 
original because the vowels aren’t fixed but the end of the words are making the 
effort’ (Kane, 2011a). The joke in the social structure is of social mobility being a 
contradiction in how Britons classify their world (Cannadine, 2000) through 
speech patterns: open-vowels means working class, closed vowels means upper 
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class (Fox, 2004: 73-75). Essex embourgeoisment is performed as a mixture of 
cockney vowels with pinched upper-class ends of words, a dramatisation of the 
move from Bethnal Green to Essex manifest in the figure of Kane’s father. This 
offers a symbolic commentary upon the social contradiction of 
embourgeoisment. 
Embourgeoisment becomes the joke in the social structure as it follows the 
propositional fallacy that social mobility therefore means enjoying the lifestyle of 
the class they economically now occupy, which Young and Wilmott (1957: 161) 
explicitly note is in fact not the case: with ‘the possession of a new house having 
sharpened the desire for other material goods, the striving becomes a competitive 
affair. The house is a major part of the explanation’. Young and Wilmott (1957: 
156-157) make the observation that the house is, much like Kane’s material, a 
source of promise and frustration: 
The house is also a challenge, demanding that their style of life shall accord with 
the standard it sets…They need carpets for the lounge, lino for the stairs, and mats 
for the front door. They need curtains. They need another bed. They need a 
kitchen table. They need new lampshades, pots and pans, grass seed and spades, 
clothes lines and bath mats, Airwick and Jeyes, mops and pails – all the 
paraphernalia of modern life for a house two or three times larger and a hundred 
times grander than the one they left behind…The first essential is money for 
material possession…A nice house and shabby clothes. 
This challenge of embourgeoisment sets the tone for Kane’s material on his 
parents class-transformation, observing this through many aspects on Young and 
Wilmott’s ‘paraphernalia of modern life’: a mother who desires Glade (‘Airwick’) 
air fresheners and an obsessive desire to clean; a father who works tirelessly for a 
Mahogany dining table, a Mercedes car and because of the demand it makes on 
his money is expressed emotionally in resentment. ‘It broke me!’ says Kane 
impersonating his father’s hatred for his Mercedes. 
Kane’s narrative ends with a climatic routine bringing together the social 
contradiction of embourgeoisment, the promise of ‘better for the kiddies’ and the 
past realities of poverty: 
Why work? Because of love and some primal drive for material wealth for the 
offspring. Brilliant. Then why, as you hand over that plastic-y bit of tat I’ve been 
begging for since October…, why do you have to provide that cancerous bit of 
sadness at the same time, constantly reminding us of how shit it was for you at an 
equivalent stage? ‘Here you go boy, take your toys but remember I rocked back 
and forth WITH NOTHING and in some way you can’t understand, ITS YOUR 
FAULT!!’…Coming in my room one Christmas…he’d always find me at Christmas, 
‘the sixth Stella [beer] is in the chamber, time to find the son and give him a tragic 
image of my childhood’. I’m surrounded by piles and piles of spoilt bastard 
plastic…I’m in bliss but…I can’t stand to think of that little blonde boy in pain, I 
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hate to think of my Dad, as boy, sad. He came into my room, ‘you got all the toys 
you want, boy? Good. I’m glad you’re happy’…He went out diagonally and…said: 
‘I’m glad you’re happy, boy, but I want you to know one thing…I was seven the 
first time I tried an egg!’…This was another one of his: ‘The first time I tried a 
fizzy drink I fucking cried!’ (Kane, 2011a) 
The ‘better for the kiddies’ ethos mixed with the pragmatic strain on income of 
embourgeoisment is jokingly expressed in the private experience of a Christmas 
memory. The biography of Kane is steeped in the transformation of British 
society: gifts are tarnished with the brush of the sociological change, of a class on 
the move both geographically and symbolically. Kane’s depiction of his parent’s 
embourgeoisment becomes anthropomorphic, expressed in voice, material 
possessions and emotional guilt. One also notices the propositional fallacies at 
work: ‘if you experience embourgeoisment for the good of the children, the 
children will be better off and happy’. Kane goes to prove this to be the opposite 
as his emotional guilt is expressed in sociological guise of ‘alternation’ – 
competing systems of meaning (Berger, 1963). It is a rite which connects 
generations of ‘working class father’ with ‘bourgeois son’ so as to disparage the 
sociological realities of a presumed merit to class mobility (cf. Friedman, 2014). 
It is as much a critique of classed society as it is a critique of localised child-
parent relations. 
Conclusion 
The value of Kane’s material is that it resonates with the audience in laughter as 
one recognises themselves within it or allows people insights into experience of a 
social world they are not part of. Yet we must remember that jokes have the 
capacity to express the contradictions and inadequacies of the social structure but 
not to change them. Joking resolves none of the contradictions with which the 
material is a symbolic commentary upon. Jokes instead leave contradictions 
purely at the level of the imagination. Kane offers no solution in practical terms, 
only stories whose comedic value allows the imaginative possibility, within 
himself and audience, to appreciate ‘life doesn’t have to be like this’. Friedman’s 
(2014: 364) recent call for a sociology of mobility attentive to the ‘psychic and 
emotional life of the individual’, specifically ‘how social space travel (upward, 
downward and horizontal) may disrupt the coherency of the self’ uses Kane as 
the case in point for such research. But notably Kane’s last words are ‘I want the 
big ideas to adumbrate the comedy without me saying, “Here’s my thesis – 
laughter optional”’ (Kane, in Friedman, 2014: 365). 
Comedic sociology uses humour to bear out social contradictions, the example in 
this article being social class and mobility. But the interpretive model outlined 
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may apply to all areas of society and social life: workplaces and organisations, 
gender roles, occupational identity, race and ethnicity, age and aging to name a 
few. As such, the point I want to stress in conclusion is that comedic sociology’s 
laughter, its figuration in astute observations upon social life, is neither to 
promote change nor to endorse the status quo. Rather the place of the comic is in 
the ‘self-heckles’ which this article has spelled out, from observation upon 
oneself to the social world we live in and the narratives which draw them 
together. The value of comedic sociology is that by identifying the arbitrary 
nature of the social, the insights it may make upon social life provides 
appreciation of the diversity of subject positions. The insights it may provide 
people on the ‘life of others’ and the ‘life of yourself’ are delivered at the level of 
incongruity, giving the audience an invitation to re-imagine the doxa of everyday 
life (if they wish). 
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